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I. INTRODUCTION
The decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court and the Michigan
Court of Appeals during the Survey period, May 23, 2007 to July 30,
2008, did not dramatically change the course of environmental law in
Michigan, nor did they contain any major surprises. The state Supreme
Court's decision in Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl
Waters North America, Inc. is the most significant decision in the Survey
period because it held that plaintiffs in Michigan Environmental
Protection Act (MEPA)1 cases must now satisfy federal standing
requirements.2 Although the Nestl9 decision may make it more difficult
for ordinary citizens to use MEPA to protect the environment in
Michigan courts, it will have no effect on their ability to participate in the
administrative process, which is usually a more productive and less
expensive venue for citizen participation in environmental decision
making. A recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision, Sierra Club
Mackinac Chapter v. Department of Environmental Quality, is likely to
t Associate, Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP. B.A., 2004, University of
Michigan; J.D., 2007, cum laude, University of Michigan Law School.
Associate, Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP. B.A., 2002, Columbia
University; J.D., 2007, Emory University Law School.
tj Partner, Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP. B.A., 1969, cum laude,
University of Dayton; J.D., 1972, cum laude, University of Michigan Law School.
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 2008).
2. 479 Mich. 280, 737 N.W.2d 447 (2007).
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facilitate citizen participation in the administrative process of issuing
wastewater permits to concentrated animal feeding operations.3 Sierra
Club and Nestl9 illustrate that environmental practitioners can expect to
spend more of their time in practice before agencies and less time before
courts.
Other decisions of Michigan courts in the past year confirm that
courts generally have little sympathy for defendants in environmental
remediation enforcement cases.4 The Michigan Court of Appeals held
that a criminal provision in Michigan's scrap tire disposal law imposes
strict liability in People v. Schumacher.5 The court of appeals also
upheld substantial penalties in a site remediation case in Department of
Environmental Quality v. Bulk Petroleum Corp.
6
II. STANDING UNDER MEPA
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) was one of the
first environmental statutes to adopt an expansive citizen suit provision.
The statute authorizes "any person" to maintain an action "for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public
trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. '
MEPA included no requirement that a plaintiff show personal injury. As
long as a citizen could initially demonstrate that the defendant had
polluted, impaired, or destroyed a natural resource or was likely to do so,
the citizen had standing. 8 Therefore, MEPA cases on standing 9
represented a significant departure from the traditional requirement that
environmental plaintiffs meet constitutional standing requirements prior
to filing suit. 10
In 2007, the Michigan Supreme Court directly addressed MEPA's
standing provision in Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl
3. 277 Mich. App. 531, 747 N.W.2d 321 (2008).
4. See discussion, infra Parts IV & V.
5. 276 Mich. App. 165, 740 N.W.2d 534 (2007).
6. 276 Mich. App. 654, 741 N.W.2d 857 (2007).
7. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701(1) (West 2008).
8. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1703(1) (West 2008); see also Heather Terry,
Comment, Still Standing But "Teed Up:" The Michigan Environmental Protection Act's
Citizen Suit Provision After Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1297, 1304 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Mich. State Highway Comm'n v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 184, 220
N.W.2d 416, 427-28 (1974) (upholding MEPA's broad standing provision by allowing
plaintiffs to initiate actions without meeting the traditional standing requirements).
10. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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Waters North America, Inc. " Prior to Nestle, the Court had indicated its
displeasure with MEPA's broad standing provision in National Wildlife
Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company. 12 In National Wildlife, the
Court stopped short of declaring MEPA's standing provision
unconstitutional. 13 The affidavits offered by the plaintiff organization
alleged actual injury or imminent harm to three of the organization's
members satisfied constitutional standing requirements, thus avoiding the
need to address the constitutionality of the MEPA standing provision. 14
In Nestle, the Court was again confronted with MEPA's standing
provision and this time struck it down. 15 Nestl was a highly publicized
case concerning streams, lakes, and wetlands located in Mecosta County,
Michigan. 16 The affected water bodies included Osprey Lake, Thompson
Lake, the Dead Stream, and various wetlands. 17
Donald and Nancy Bollman granted the defendant, Nestl6 Waters
North America ("Nestle"), the groundwater rights to a 139 acre parcel of
land located on the northern shore of Osprey Lake. '8 Nestld obtained all
appropriate water permits from the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality and began operations. 19 Michigan Citizens for
Water Conservation (MCWC), a non-profit corporation of approximately
1,300 members, filed suit seeking temporary and permanent injunctive
relief to prevent Nestl6's construction of a bottling facility and
challenging Nestl6's right to withdraw water from the location. 0 In
asserting its claim at trial, the plaintiff relied on both common-law
riparian groundwater law and MEPA.2 l Ultimately, the trial court
determined that Nestld 's pumping activities caused "ecological impacts"
11. 479 Mich. 280, 737 N.W.2d 447 (2007).
12. 471 Mich. 608, 684 N.W.2d 800 (2004).
13. Id. at 652-53, 684 N.W.2d at 827 (Weaver, J., concurring in result only).
14. Id. at 632, 684 N.W.2d at 815. National Wildlife was discussed in greater depth
by Browne Lewis, Environmental Law, 2004 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 52 WAYNE L.
REv. 637, 655-60 (2006).
15. Nestl, 479 Mich. at 302-03, 737 N.W.2d at 459.
16. Id. at 285, 737 N.W.2d at 450.
17. Id. at 286, 737 N.W.2d at 450. The wetlands in question were identified as
Wetlands 112, 115, and 301 and are located west and north of Osprey Lake. Id.
Additionally, Osprey Lake is a manmade lake, created by damming and flooding the
Dead Stream. Id. Thompson Lake is a naturally formed lake just south of Osprey Lake.
Id.
18. Nestld, 479 Mich. at 286, 737 N.W.2d at 450. The Bollman's land surrounds
Osprey Lake and several of the enumerated wetlands. Id.
19. Id. at 287, 737 N.W.2d at 450.
20. Id. at 288, 737 N.W.2d at 451. Two hundred and sixty-five MCWC members are
riparian owners in the Tri-Lakes region. Two members own land on the Dead Stream and
two others own land on Thompson Lake. Id.
21. Id.
20091
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and "hydrological effects" on a "zone of influence" which included the
Dead Stream, Thompson Lake, Osprey Lake, and various associated
wetlands, which violated both riparian law and MEPA.22
Both the plaintiff and defendant appealed the case to the court of
appeals, which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the
trial court.23 In its appeal of the MEPA claim, Nestl6 argued that MCWC
lacked standing to make a claim with respect to Osprey Lake and the
various wetlands.24 The majority opinion, however, held that the plaintiff
organization had standing "with respect to all the natural sources at
issue. '25 In its determination, the court of appeals applied MEPA's broad
citizen suit provision. Thus, despite there being no evidence that any
member of MCWC actually used or participated in activities on Osprey
Lake or the wetlands, the court of appeals held that there was standing
because any harm to one of the interrelated nature of the water bodies
would cause harm to other water bodies or associated wetlands. 26 Both
parties appealed the court of appeals decision for various reasons.
However, the Michigan Supreme Court limited the case to the plaintiffs
standing with respect to Osprey Lake and associated wetlands.27
In its analysis of standing, the state Supreme Court focused on
whether the Legislature has authority to expand standing.28 The main
argument proffered by the majority made up of Justices Young, Taylor,
Corrigan and Markman was the Michigan Legislature impermissibly
expanded the "judicial power" to include circumstances involving non-
injured parties by permitting "any person" to commence an action.29 The
Court emphasized the principle of separation of powers in both the State
Constitution of Michigan and in the United States Constitution.3 °
According to the Court, allowing the legislature to negate the principle of
standing undermines the doctrine of separation of powers and the
tripartite system of government.31 Noting that "judicial power" is an
undefined term in the Michigan Constitution, the Court referred to its
22. Nestl, 479 Mich. at 288, 737 N.W.2d at 451.
23. See Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. NestI6 Waters N. Am. Inc., 269
Mich. App. 25, 709 N.W.2d 174 (2005).
24. Id. at 34, 709 N.W.2d at 184.
25. Nestle, 479 Mich. 289, 737 N.W.2d at 452.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 291, 737 N.W.2d at 453.
28. Id. at 291-96, 737 N.W.2d at 453-55.
29. Id. at 302, 737 N.W.2d at 458.
30. Id. at 291-92, 737 N.W.2d at 453. The Court highlighted parallels between the
United States Constitution's limitation of the "judicial power" to "[c]ases and
[c]ontroversies" and the Michigan's constitution which charges the judiciary with the
"task of exercising the 'judicial power."' Nestl, 479 Mich. at 292, 737 N.W.2d at 453.
31. Id. at 292, 737 N.W.2d at 453.
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discussion in National Wildlife regarding the traditional definition of
"judicial power., 32 The court determined that the most vital aspect of
"judicial power" is the "requirement of a genuine case or controversy
between the parties, one in which there is a real, not hypothetical,
dispute. 33 Relying on United States Supreme Court Chief Justice
Roberts for further support, the court stressed that the judiciary has no
function where no case or controversy exists34 and that courts that fail to
exercise discipline and restraint in resolving conflicts would swallow up
the tripartite government.35
The Michigan Supreme Court formally adopted the federal test for
standing in MEPA cases. 36 The federal test for standing has three
elements. First, there must be an allegation of "an injury in fact" which is
an assault upon "a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. 37 Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the action being challenged-that is, the injury must be "fairly
traceable" to the complained conduct. 38 Last, the individual must show
that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision"--that is, that a
favorable decision will remedy the injury.39 This standard was adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
4 °
32. Id. at 293, 737 N.W.2d at 453-54. The court stated:
The "judicial power" has traditionally been defined by a combination of
considerations: [T]he existence of a real dispute, or case or controversy; the
avoidance of deciding hypothetical questions; the plaintiff who has suffered
real harm; the existence of genuinely adverse parties; the sufficient ripeness or
maturity of a case; the eschewing of cases that are moot at any stage of their
litigation; the ability to issue proper forms of effective relief to a party; the
avoidance of political questions or other non-justiciable controversies; the
avoidance of unnecessary constitutional issues; and the emphasis upon
proscriptive as opposed to prescriptive decision making.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs, 471 Mich. 608, 615, 684 N.W.2d
800, 806 (2004)).
33. Id. at 293, 737 N.W.2d at 454 (quoting Nat'l Wildlife, 471 Mich. at 615, 684
N.W.2d at 806).
34. Id. at 293-94, 737 N.W.2d at 454.
35. Nestlj, 479 Mich. at 294, 737 N.W.2d at 454; see also DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting 4 Papers of John Marshall 95 (C. Cullen ed.,
1984)).




40. 504 U.S. at 560-61. Lujan held that the broad citizen suit provision of the
Endangered Species Act authorizing "any person" to bring a claim against a person or
agency alleged to be in violation of the act was limited by Article III of the United States
Constitution. Id. Plaintiffs claiming violations of the Endangered Species Act must show
2009]
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and later by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lee v. Macomb County
Board of Commissioners.41 The Nestl Court now extended the Lujan
standing criteria to environmental plaintiffs who file claims under
MEPA, effectively eliminating MEPA's broad standing provision.42 In
order to successfully argue standing, Michigan environmental plaintiffs
asserting violations of MEPA must now affirm that they in fact use the
affected area and that they are persons whose "aesthetic and recreational
values" will be detrimentally affected by the challenged activity.43
Turning to the case at hand, the Court applied the Lujan test to the
facts of the Nestl case. 44 The Court noted that the MCWC's
organizational standing to bring a claim extended only to matters where
members would have standing to bring a claim as individuals.45 As to the
Dead Stream and Thompson Lake, it held that the MCWC clearly had
standing to bring a MEPA claim because four of its members (two for
each body of water) had riparian rights to the bodies of water.46
Therefore, with respect to these particular bodies of water, any activity
by Nestle would injure riparian rights causing a clear injury in fact.
47
However, the analysis was more complicated with respect to Osprey
Lake and the various wetlands in question, because there was no
indication that any members of the MCWC enjoyed a substantial
interest-recreational, aesthetic, or economic-in these water bodies.48
Because members of MCWC had no access or use of Osprey Lake or the
associated wetlands, the plaintiff organization had no concrete and
particularized injury with respect to the water bodies. 49 As a result the
Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing with respect to Osprey Lake
and the three wetlands. 50
In reaching its decision, the Michigan Supreme Court formally
rejected the court of appeals ruling that the interconnected nature of the
water bodies was sufficient to create standing. 51 The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings that the hydrological link and
a direct injury to their own interest in addition to a violation of the act itself. Id. at 562-
63.
41. 464 Mich. 726, 739, 629 N.W.2d 900, 908 (2001).
42. Nestld, 479 Mich. at 295-96, 737 N.W.2d at 455.
43. Id.; see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 183.
44. Nestlg, 479 Mich. at 299-300, 737 N.W.2d at 457.
45. Id. at 296, 737 N.W.2d at 455.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 297, 737 N.W.2d at 456.
49. Id.




interrelated nature of the bodies of water was sufficient to grant standing
to the plaintiff with respect to all of the water bodies including Osprey
Lake and the surrounding wetlands, despite there being no actual
evidence that plaintiff or its members used or were present in those
areas. 52 In the Michigan Supreme Court's view, the lower courts'
"interconnectedness" theory permits an evasion of the plaintiff's burden
to establish a concrete, particularized injury in fact. 53 The state Supreme
Court cited Lujan in its rejection of the "ecosystem nexus" approach to
standing.54 In a resounding disapproval of the lower courts' approach,
the court pointed out that were the "ecosystem nexus" approach to
standing valid, "it would justify the standing of anyone but a Martian to
contest water withdrawals in Michigan. 55
The Court also responded to MCWC's argument that impairment of
its members' aesthetic and recreational interests alone would satisfy
constitutional standing.56 MCWC relied on Cantrell v. City of Long
Beach57 where the Ninth Circuit extended standing to birdwatchers
whose recreational and aesthetic interest of bird watching was affected
by defendants' acts. The Cantrell court asserted that the plaintiff
birdwatchers' right to view birds located on private property from
publicly accessible locations was sufficient to confer standing.58 Without
endorsing the Ninth Circuit's expansion of standing to "recreational and
aesthetic interests," the court pointed out that MCWC failed to allege
such an impairment of its members' interests in Osprey Lake and the
associated wetlands. 59
The plaintiff argued that the Michigan Constitution permitted the
legislature's enactment of MEPA's broad standing provision.6° Article 4,
section 52 of the Michigan Constitution, which MCWC based its
argument on, establishes a public interest in the protection of Michigan's
natural resources and directs the Legislature to enact appropriate
legislation to protect these natural resources. 61 The majority dismissed
this argument noting that neither the public interest provision in the
Michigan Constitution nor the MEPA standing provision permit the
52. Id. at 297-98, 737 N.W.2d at 456.
53. Id. at 298, 737 N.W.2d 456-57.
54. Id. at 299, 737 N.W.2d at 457; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-66.
55. Nestl6, 479 Mich. at 300, 737 N.W.2d at 457.
56. Id. at 301, 737 N.W.2d at 458.
57. 241 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2001).
58. See id. at 680-81.
59. Nestl,, 479 Mich. at 300-301, 737 N.W.2d at 458.
60. Id. at 301-302, 737 N.W.2d at 458.
61. MICH. CONST. art IV, § 52.
2009]
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erosion of the traditional notions of standing.62 Accordingly, the
Michigan Supreme Court characterized its holding as a "refining" as
opposed to dismissal of the plaintiff s MEPA claim.
63
Three justices dissented in this case. Justice Weaver, with Justice
Cavanaugh concurring, was highly critical of the majority decision and
accused the majority of eroding Michigan's traditional rules of standing
in a string of cases. 64 Justice Weaver charged the majority of four with
forcibly inserting Article III Lujan standing into Michigan case law and
then ultimately converting standing into a constitutional question.
65
According to Justice Weaver, the majority adopted the Lujan standing
test under the assumption that "judicial power" granted to the state courts
in the Michigan Constitution was identical to the same "judicial power"
granted under Article III in the United States Constitution.66 She pointed
out that the State Constitution of Michigan has no corollary to Article III
of the United States Constitution.67 The end result, in Justice Weaver's
view, was that the majority not only undermined the Michigan
Constitution but also took away the legislature's ability to restore "the
private citizen['s] sizeable share of the initiative for environmental law
enforcement.,
68
In contrast with Justice Weaver, Justice Kelly refused to ignore
binding precedent offered under both Lee and National Wildlife in her
dissent. 69 However, Justice Kelly found it unnecessary to revisit Lee and
National Wildlife because she felt that MCWC had met the three pronged
standing test.7° In Justice Kelly's view, once a plaintiff has standing to
challenge an activity, "it can raise other inadequacies on the basis of the
public interest., 71 The trial court had found that Dead Stream, Thompson
62. Nestle, 479 Mich. at 302, 737 N.W.2d at 458-59.
63. Id. at 297, 737 N.W.2d at 456 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 311, 737 N.W.2d at 463.
65. Id. Justice Weaver pointed out that in Lee, which marked the first appearance of
Article III standing in Michigan case law, the parties did not even raise or brief anything
pertaining to Lujan or Article III standing. Id.
66. Id. at 313, 737 N.W.2d at 465.
67. Nestle, 479 Mich. at 314, 737 N.W.2d at 465 (Weaver, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 316, 737 N.W.2d at 466 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 324, 737 N.W.2d at 470 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 330, 737 N.W.2d at 474 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Justice Kelly also discussed
several cases which illustrated this point. Id. at 328-30, 737 N.W.2d at 472-75 (discussing
Citizens Comm. Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Ohio
1982) (finding that plaintiff's standing to assert his environmental injury granted him
standing to assert the general public interest); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (deciding that plaintiffs standing to assert a claim on at least one ground was
sufficient to allow them to raise other environmental inadequacies).
[Vol. 55:313
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Lake, Osprey Lake and the associated wetlands shared a common aquifer
where withdrawals by Nestld would result in varied reduction of water
levels of all four bodies of water.7 2 Once the MCWC had established
standing to assert its own interests with respect to the Dead Stream and
Thompson Lake, it could also assert the interests of the general public on
Osprey Lake and the associated wetlands.73
In the 2006 Survey period, author Browne Lewis concluded that
National Wildlife would not have a significant impact on environmental
law in Michigan.74 However, Nestl is the realization of the National
Wildlife decision: environmental plaintiffs must now conform to
traditional federal standing requirements.75 While it seems unlikely that
the Nestl standing requirements will severely limit environmental
plaintiffs' access to the courts because most plaintiffs have a direct
connection to the activity complained of, the full effect of the decision
remains to be seen.76
III. CLEAN WATER ACT
Sierra Club Mackinac Chapter v. Department of Environmental
Quality increased public participation in the issuance of permits under
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) to
owners of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).77 The Sierra
72. Nestl6, 479 Mich. at 325, 737 N.W.2d at 471. Specifically, the trial court found
that for every gallon of water pumped out by Nestle, the surface water levels of the Dead
Stream would fall by two inches, the level of at least one of the associated wetlands
would fall by one and a half feet while others would fall by two to four inches, and both
Osprey Lake and Thompson Lake would fall by as much as six inches. Id.
73. Id. at 330, 737 N.W.2d at 474.
74. Lewis, supra note 14, at 660.
75. Nestl, 479 Mich. at 298, 737 N.W.2d at 457.
76. At least one court has already applied the new standing requirements to an
environmental plaintiff. In Coldsprings Twp. v. Kalkaska County Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff township's claim
because of a failure to show it suffered a concrete, particularized injury. 279 Mich. App.
25, 755 N.W.2d 553 (2008). While Nestlk was cited, the petitioner's claim was denied
because the municipality impermissibly attempted to represent residents under the
doctrine ofparens patriae; the township's power is derivative and not sovereign in nature
rendering parens patriae inapplicable. Id. at 29-30, 755 N.W.2d at 555-56. The court of
appeals clarified that, under Nestl, the township must demonstrate that it suffered a
concrete, particularized, injury caused by the county's decision. Id. at 30, 755 N.W.2d at
556.
77. 277 Mich. App. 531, 747 N.W.2d 321. Large CAFOs house hundreds or even
thousands of livestock. Id. at 535, 747 N.W.2d at 324. Many feedlots generate significant
amounts of manure (liquid and solid waste) and then dispose of it by applying the manure
as fertilizer on agricultural fields. Id.
2009]
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Club appealed the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's
(DEQ) declaratory ruling rejecting the group's Clean Water Act
78
challenges to a general permit for Michigan CAFO owners.79
The Clean Water Act prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant" into
waters of the United States from "point sources" without a NPDES
permit. 80 Parties who have obtained an NPDES permit may discharge
effluent into the navigable waters of the United States. 8' CAFO owners
are required to obtain either an individual NPDES permit or obtain
coverage under an NPDES general permit.
82
In Sierra Club, DEQ issued a general CAFO permit in mid-2004
after subjecting a proposed general NPDES permit to public notice and
comment.83 Among the various requirements of a general permit for a
large CAFO, CAFO owners must develop and implement a nutrient
management plan, which is a plan to manage the nutrients released into
water from manure, litter, and wastewater. 84 However, this plan, which is
called the comprehensive nutrient management plan (CNMP) and
"describes the production practices, equipment, and structure(s) that the
owner/operator of an agricultural operation now uses and/or will
implement to sustain livestock and/or crop production in a manner that is
both environmentally and economically sound," is not a part of the
permit application or the permit itself and thus is not subject to public
notice and comment. 85 Only a general summary of the CNMP is required
for an application under the general permit. 86 Furthermore, rather than
applying numerical standards, the general permit merely requires annual
reviews of and updates to each CAFO's CNMP, so there is little
opportunity for public notice and comment on CNMPs. 
87
Sierra Club requested a declaratory ruling from DEQ regarding (1)
whether the general permit allowed CAFOs to submit a CNMP that
would not be reviewed or approved by DEQ, (2) whether the general
permit's failure to provide public notice and comment on the CNMP
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
79. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 532-33, 747 N.W.2d at 323.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006).
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2006).
82. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 536, 747 N.W.2d at 325; see also 40 C.F.R.
122.23(d)(1) (2008). The DEQ operates a federally approved NPDES permit system, thus
all state administrative rules parallel the Clean Water Act and all associated regulations.
See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2102 (2008); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2103 (2008);
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 323.2104 (2008); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 3232.2196 (2008).
83. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 538-39, 747 N.W.2d at 326.
84. Id. at 536, 747 N.W.2d at 325.
85. Id. at 539, 747 N.W.2d at 326 (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 539-40, 747 N.W.2d at 327.
322 [Vol. 55:313
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violated the Clean Water Act, and (3) whether the general permit
violated Section 402 of the Clean Water Act by authorizing the discharge
of pollutants without meeting the water quality requirements of the Clean
Water Act. 88 DEQ rejected these claims in a declaratory ruling, asserting
that requests for authorization under the general permit did not require
separate notice and comment, because the general permit was already
subject to public notice and comment. 89 Furthermore, DEQ asserted that
CNMP was neither a part of the permit application nor the permit itself,
but it conceded that the CNMP was a valuable resource which aided
DEQ in its determinations of whether a CAFO operator was capable of
complying with the conditions of the general permit. 90 Sierra Club
appealed the declaratory ruling to the circuit court arguing that a CAFO's
nutrient management plan is an effluent limitation which should be
included in a NPDES permit application. 91 The circuit court affirmed
DEQ's declaratory ruling, holding that the issuance of the general permit
was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 92 Sierra Club
subsequently appealed the circuit court's ruling.
93
After affirming jurisdiction, the Michigan Court of Appeals turned to
the declaratory ruling itself.94 The court relied in part on a Second
Circuit decision in Waterkeeper Alliance Inc. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, which held that a similar federal
CAFO rule was legally deficient because of its failure to allow for the
meaningful review of nutrient management plans and require the
inclusion of the nutrient plans in NPDES permits. 95 The court of appeals
noted that the DEQ's general permit impermissibly delegated the
authority to determine and adopt rates for the disposal of liquid waste to
88. Id. at 540-41, 747 N.W.2d at 327.
89. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 541-42, 747 N.W.2d at 327-28.
90. Id. at 542, 747 N.W.2d at 328. DEQ did make some alterations to the general
permit. Id.
91. Id. at 543, 747 N.W.2d at 328.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 543, 747 N.W.2d at 328-29.
94. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 545, 747 N.W.2d at 330-31. One judge dissented,
arguing that the dispositive issue in the case was whether DEQ complied with all of the
federal statutory and regulatory requirements of the NPDES program. Id. at 555, 747
N.W.2d at 335 (Zahra, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge refused to consider Sierra
Club's arguments whether DEQ was in compliance with the Clean Water Act because the
proper forum for such a case is the United States Court of Appeals. Id.
95. 399 F.3d 486, 498 (2nd Cir. 2005); see also Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 549-
50, 747 N.W.2d at 332.
2009]
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CAFOs. 9 6 CNMPs contained "effluent limitations" which must be
incorporated into applications under general permit.
97
Turning to the Sierra Club's argument that the general permit's
failure to incorporate the CNMP into permit applications was a violation
of the Clean Water Act's public participation provision, the court of
appeals emphasized the provision that there be an "'opportunity for
public' hearing before a NPDES permit issues." 98 The court further
pointed out "that a copy of each permit application and each permit
issued under this section [1342] shall be available to the public." 99
Because Section 1251(e) of the Clean Water Act "requires public
participation in development, revision, and enforcement of effluent
limitations,"' 100 and comprehensive nutrient management plans are
"effluent limitations,"' 0 ' the court concluded that public participation is
required in the development, revision and enforcement of the plans.
10 2
The court was unconvinced by DEQ's argument that CNMPs were
accessible to the public via Michigan's Freedom of Information Act,
ruling such a method to be meaningless. 103
While Sierra Club has not technically increased the burden on
CAFO operators seeking authorization for effluent releases under a
NPDES general permit, it may have a significant effect on the ability of
CAFO operators to successfully achieve such authorization. Forcing
CAFO operators to submit a CNMP along with their applications for
authorization under a general permit has increased opportunities for
public participation in the issuance of NPDES permits. Incorporating the
CNMP into the application may also give the public more information to
use in challenging CAFO applications.
IV. PART 201
In Department of Environmental Quality v. Waterous Co., the
Michigan Court of Appeals addressed a wide range of issues regarding
96. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 551, 747 N.W.2d at 333. The general permit
allowed the DEQ to determine the adequacy of a CNMP but such a review was not
required prior to the discharge of pollutants. Id.
97. Id. at 552, 747 N.W.2d at 334.
98. Id. at 553, 747 N.W.2d at 334; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006); 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(1), (b)(3) (2006).
99. Sierra Club, 277 Mich. App. at 553-54, 747 N.W.2d at 334; see also 33 U.S.C. §
13420) (2006).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006).
101. Id.




remediation of hazardous substances, including whether a liable party
may be compelled to remediate a contaminated former industrial site to
residential standards, and what effect may be given to unpromulgated
sediment guidelines. '04
The case involved property located in Traverse City that the Traverse
City Iron Works (TCIW) had used as a foundry from the early 1900s
until 1974.105 TCIW disposed of approximately 80,000 cubic yards of
foundry sand and slag on the banks and the bottom of the Boardman
River. 10 6 In 1978, TCIW merged with the Waterous Company
(Waterous). 10 7 Title to the property was conveyed to Waterous in
1980.10' In 1982, Waterous sold the property to a developer who resold it
in 1997 to a second developer. 10 9 The second developer used a site
reclamation grant from DEQ to construct a retaining wall along the bank
of the Boardman River and to add backfill behind the wall to facilitate
the property's redevelopment for commercial and residential use.1 0
In 2003, DEQ sued Waterous under Parts 31 and 201 of NREPA and
under the common law of public nuisance to recover past response
activity costs, for a declaratory judgment for future costs, and for
injunctive relief."'1 Waterous responded with a host of denials, defenses
and pre-trial motions, arguing that other parties had caused the
contamination in the River, that Waterous was not liable for any
contamination caused by TCIW, that some of DEQ's costs were costs of
residential redevelopment and were not necessary to remediate the site
consistent with its historic industrial use, and that DEQ could not recover
costs to comply with the developer's "due care" obligations under Part
201.' 12 Waterous also argued that the statute of limitations barred DEQ's
public nuisance claim for injunctive relief"11
3
104. 279 Mich. App. 346, No. 272968, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307 (Mich. App. Ct.
April 15, 2008).
105. Id. at 349, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *1.
106. Id., 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *1-2.
107. Id. at 350, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *2.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 350, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *2-3.
111. Id. at 356, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *11-12. DEQ also sued to recover
natural resource damages, but dismissed that claim without prejudice before trial. Id. at
369, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *30.
112. Id. at 351-53, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *3-7. Part 201 of the NREPA
requires a person who owns or operates property that it knows is contaminated above
residential criteria to take certain steps with respect to hazardous substances on such
property. MICH. CoMe. LAWS ANN. § 324.20107a (West 2008). The actions that a non-
liable owner or operator must perform are commonly referred to as "due care
obligations." Id. The developers of the TCIW property involved in this case, and
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Before trial, the parties resolved DEQ's claim for past response
activity costs by stipulation requiring Waterous to pay $1.25 million of
the approximately $1.6 million DEQ had claimed. 114 Persuading DEQ to
waive $350,000 of its past costs would prove to be Waterous's only
victory in the case."'
The trial focused on whether Waterous was liable under Part 201 for
DEQ's future response activity costs and whether DEQ was entitled to a
mandatory injunction requiring Waterous to investigate and remediate
the site and abate a public nuisance. 116 After a two-week trial, the court
found that TCIW had released or discharged sand, slag, and other
foundry waste at the site, that those materials contained Part 201
hazardous substances, and that the site was a Part 201 "facility." ' l 7 The
court held that Waterous was liable under Part 201 because it was the
successor-by-merger to TCIW. 1 8 The court entered a declaratory
judgment holding Waterous liable for DEQ's future response activity
costs and granted a broad permanent injunction requiring Waterous to
perform a remedial investigation of soil, groundwater, and sediment at
the site; conduct a feasibility study of remedial action options; prepare
and implement a remedial action plan (RAP) after DEQ approval; and
implement any other response activity needed to protect public health
and the environment." 9 The court also held that "conditions at the Site
constituted a public nuisance.'1
20
One of the more interesting issues on appeal was whether Waterous
was liable for response activity costs beyond those necessary to comply
with industrial cleanup criteria. Waterous relied on several cases under
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 12 1 involving claims by private parties for
response costs to support its argument that costs beyond those required to
comply with industrial cleanup criteria were not "necessary" and were
therefore not recoverable. 122 The court of appeals rejected this argument
subsequent owners and operators, probably incurred and will continue to incur certain
expenses in meeting their due care obligations. Some of those expenses may have been
paid with funds from DEQ's site reclamation grant.
113. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 383, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *49.
114. Id. at 356-57, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *11-12.
115. See id. at 350-51, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *2.
116. Id. at 352-54, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *6-7.
117. Id. at 357-58, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *12-14.
118. Id. at 358-59, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *14-15.
119. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 360-62, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *16-18.
120. Id. at 358, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *14.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
122. Waterous relied on City of Detroit v. Simon, 247 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001) and
Regional Airport Authority v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2006), both of which
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because Part 201123 specifies "current zoning" and "current property use"
as the basis for a RAP. 124 The court held that "the proper cleanup criteria
should be consistent with the current zoning and use of the property at
the time of remedial action."' 125 The lesson from this holding is that an
owner of contaminated property who is liable under Part 201 should
either remediate the property or record an enforceable restrictive
covenant limiting future use of the property before transferring it.
Waterous also argued on appeal that the trial court impermissibly
held Waterous liable for remedial obligations of other entities, including
the due care obligations of the developer and the current property
owner. 126 Because DEQ and Waterous agreed before trial to settle DEQ's
claim for past response activity costs, which presumably included the site
reclamation grant, and because the developer and the current owner were
not parties to the litigation, it is unclear whether DEQ future response
activity costs will include any costs of complying with due care
obligations. 127 Therefore, this issue was probably moot. Nonetheless, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on this issue, holding
that Part 201 imposes primary responsibility upon "those persons who
are responsible for the environmental contamination," and that if an non-
liable current owner exacerbates existing contamination by violating its
due care obligations, the only remedy the liable party has is to seek
contribution under Section 324.20129 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws. 128 This portion of the court of appeals decision could be
interpreted as meaning that a non-liable property owner is entitled to
recover the cost of complying with its due care obligations from a liable
involved claims by municipalities under Section 107(a)(4)(B) to recover "necessary costs
of response" the municipalities had incurred in remediating contaminated properties to
levels cleaner than required to allow the properties to be used for industrial purposes.
Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 365-66, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *24-25. This
argument by Waterous was weak for various reasons, including the fact that in both
CERCLA and Part 201, the requirement that response costs be considered "necessary" to
be recoverable applies only to claims asserted by plaintiffs other than the United States, a
state, or an Indian tribe. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 324.20126a(1)(b) (West 2008). Part 201 authorizes the state to recover "all costs of
response activity lawfully incurred by the state," whether or not such costs are
"necessary." MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126a(l)(a) (West 2008). Thus, Waterous'
argument based on decisions in private party cost recovery actions under CERCLA is not
persuasive in the context of a cost recovery action by the State of Michigan under Part
201.
123. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(6) (West 2008).
124. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 365-67, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *26-27.
125. Id. at 367, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *26.
126. Id. at 352-54, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *6-7.
127. Id. at 387, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *55.
128. Id. at 372-75, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *35-38.
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party. Such an interpretation would encourage some non-liable owners to
seek to recover the costs of their due care obligations from persons who
are liable under Part 201, something that non-liable owners have
traditionally not done.
The court of appeals also discussed whether an expert witness may
rely on unpromulgated guidelines as the basis for an opinion that
contaminated sediments should be investigated and/or remediated.129 A
DEQ expert witness relied on unpromulgated sediment quality screening
guidelines and a draft DEQ memorandum to support his opinion
testimony that the court should order Waterous to investigate and
remediate contaminated sediments. 130 Waterous contended on appeal that
the trial court should not have admitted the expert's testimony because
the sediment guidelines he relied upon were unpromulgated and
inherently unreliable. 131 The court of appeals concluded that the trial
court had not abused its discretion under Michigan Rule of Evidence 702
by admitting the expert testimony.132 It appears that the expert used the
sediment guidelines only for the limited purpose of supporting the
expert's opinion that a detailed remedial investigation was necessary
performed, rather than to support selection of any particular cleanup
plan. 133
The court of appeals also addressed how the statute of limitations
applies to public nuisance claims seeking injunctive relief. 134 Waterous
argued that the six-year statute of limitations 35 barred the state's claim
for injunctive relief based on public nuisance law. 136 Waterous argued
that the "continuing wrong doctrine" applies only when a defendant's
wrongful acts, not the effects thereof, are continuing, and that the alleged
wrongful acts in this case ceased when TCIW stopped disposing of
foundry waste in 1978.137 That argument should have succeeded if DEQ
had asserted a claim for money damages based on negligence. However,
as the court of appeals noted, the continuing wrong doctrine applies
129. Id. at 280-83, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *45-49.
130. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 381, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *47.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 382-83, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *48.
133. Id., 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *48-49.
134. Id. at 383-86, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *49-54. It is not clear why DEQ
pursued a public nuisance claim at all, considering the availability of injunctive relief
under both Part 201 and Part 31. DEQ may have pursued its public nuisance claim
because there are no promulgated sediment criteria under Part 201.
135. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5813 (West 2008).
136. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 383, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *50.
137. Id. at 384, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *51.
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differently in the context of trespass and nuisance cases.' 3 8 The court
explained, citing Traver Lakes Community Maintenance Ass'n v.
Douglas Co. 139 that "where a nuisance is temporary . . . damages to
property affected by the nuisance are recurrent and may be recovered
from time to time until the nuisance is abated."1 40 The court of appeals
reasoned that "Part 201 was designed to address temporary nuisances,
like the claims herein," and concluded that DEQ is entitled to recover
damages until the nuisance is abated without its claim being time
barred. 141 The court's discussion of the statute of limitations can be
criticized because it improperly assumes that the presence of 80,000 tons
of foundry sand is a "temporary" condition that it is "abatable by
reasonable curative or remedial action."' 142 The court should have
remanded for a determination of this factual issue as it did in Traver
Lakes.
The court of appeals decision is also significant because it upheld a
very broad grant of injunctive relief. The trial court ordered Waterous not
only to pay DEQ's future response activity costs, but also to perform a
complete remedial investigation and to develop and implement a
remedial action plan to be approved by DEQ. 143 Waterous argued on
appeal that it should have been required to investigate and remediate
only the four hazardous substances that the trial court found to have a
potential to affect aquatic life, and that were alleged in DEQ's complaint,
rather than all possible hazardous substances. 44 The court of appeals
agreed with DEQ that the complaint's allegations regarding a few
hazardous substances were intended only to show that the site was a Part
201 "facility," and that DEQ's pre-complaint investigation was not
intended to identify all hazardous substances that might be present at the
site. 145 The court of appeals properly rejected Waterous's argument on
this point.
In conclusion, both the trial court and the court of appeals resolved
numerous issues, including some that may have been of first impression.
Although the court of appeals decided most or all issues correctly, its
discussions of several issues, including the recoverability of costs
incurred to comply with due care obligations and the proper use of
138. Id. at 386, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *53-54.
139. 224 Mich. App. 335, 341, 568 N.W.2d 847 (1997).
140. Waterous, 279 Mich. App. at 385, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *53 (citing
Traver Lakes, 224 Mich. App. at 347-48, 568 N.W.2d at 853).
141. Id. at 386, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *53-54.
142. Id. at 385, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *53.
143. Id. at 371-72, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *32-33.
144. Id. at 371-72, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *32-35.
145. Id. at 371-72, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1307, at *33.
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unpromulgated sediment guidelines, are not very clear and may tempt
some litigants to cite this decision for principles broader than its actual
holdings.
V. PROTECTION OF RESOURCES
Two recent Michigan Court of Appeals cases highlighted a key point
in the day-to-day practice of negotiations with state agencies. 146 In
Jacques v. Department of Environmental Quality, the court of appeals
decision reiterated the deference courts give to agency decision-making
and the importance of the administrative process. 147 The plaintiff, Mr.
Jacques, requested a special exception to build a driveway to a lakeside
home he planned to construct in a critical dune area in Pentwater,
Michigan.148 The Michigan DEQ denied Mr. Jacques' application for a
permit or special exception for the driveway and instead recommended a
park-and-walk system, which involved installing a parking area adjacent
to the road and a boardwalk and stair system to connect the parking area
to the proposed home. 149
Critical dune areas are defined in and protected by the Sand Dune
Protection and Management Act (SDPMA). 150 Unless a variance is
issued under a local zoning ordinance or DEQ permits a special
exemption, any development, silvicultural, or recreational activity
involving contour changes that result in increased erosion, decreased
stability, or are more extensive than required are limited.' 5
Mr. Jacques appealed the denial to the circuit court, where DEQ's
decision was reversed on the basis that the driveway and park-and-walk
proposals were equally supported by the evidence and that decision lay
with the property owner not DEQ. 152 DEQ appealed the circuit court
reversal of its decision to the court of appeals. 1
53
After dismissing Mr. Jacques' argument that D)FO did t__t h1_:'e
authority to regulate the driveway, the court reaffirmed its deference to
146. See Jacques v. Dep't Envtl. Quality, No. 268016, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 1997
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007); Schultz v. Dep't Envtl. Quality, No. 271285, 2007 Mich.
App. LEXIS 430 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2007).
147. Jacques, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 1997, at *1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *1-2.
150. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.35301-.35301 (West 2008).
151. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.35301(j), 324.35316(1)(d) (West 2008). Also
restricted are uses which involve the removal of vegetation which can result in increased
erosion or decreased stability and uses which are not deemed to be in the public interest.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.35301(), (g) (West 2008).
152. Jacques, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 1997, at *2.
153. Id. at *1.
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the agency's interpretation of the statute. 5 4 The Michigan Court of
Appeals then turned to its investigation of whether the lower court had
overstepped its bounds and "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" its
review of DEQ's factual inquiry. 155 A court's review of an agency's
factual finding is "limited to determining whether the decision was
supported by competent material, and substantial evidence on the whole
record, was arbitrary or capricious, or was clearly an abuse of
discretion."' 156 Here, the circuit court failed to give proper deference to
DEQ's inquiry into the driveway proposal. 157 The circuit court
substituted its own judgment for DEQ's by declaring the driveway and
park-and-walk options substantially similar and neither was more
detrimental to the sand dunes than the other. 158 The circuit court ignored
DEQ's inquiry and the substantial evidence before it which indicated that
park-and-walk plan impacted less square footage on the sand dunes than
the attached driveway option. 
159
Mr. Jacques also argued that the agency referee gave insufficient
weight to his safety concerns about the park-and-walk option. 160 The
court of appeals supported DEQ's determination that there was little
difference in the safety of each proposal. 161 DEQ's decision was
supported by the substantial evidence made available during the
hearing. 62 Ultimately, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that
the circuit court failed to give proper deference to DEQ's decision; it
grossly misapplied its review of the agency's factual findings.' 
63
154. Id. at *2-5. Mr. Jacques argued that the agency lacked the statutory authority
necessary to regulate the proposed driveway's impact on critical dunes and that any
impacts should be considered on a statewide level rather than on a local one. Id. at *2.
155. Id. at *6.
156. Id. at *5 (quoting Romulus v. Dep't Envtl. Quality, 260 Mich. App. 54, 678
N.W.2d 444 (2003)).
157. Jacques, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 1997, at *7.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *7-9. The driveway option would have impacted 1,620 square feet of dune
area with more than 1,100 square feet located on slopes with an incline greater than
thirty-three percent. Id. at *9. Meanwhile, the park-and-walk option would have impacted
nine hundred forty square feet with only six hundred square feet of impact on slopes with
inclines of greater than thirty-three percent. Id.
160. Id. at *10-12. These concerns included the steep grade of the park-and-walk
option's staircase and the possibility of a user falling. Jacques, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS
1997, at * 10-12. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the respondent agency failed to
consider his personal circumstances (his wife's osteoporosis) in making its determination.
Id. at *13. However, the court of appeals supported the agency's interpretation of
SDPMA as not permitting the consideration of personal circumstances. Id. at * 13-14.
161. Id. at *10-12.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *9.
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The Jacques case illustrates that Michigan courts continue their
deference to agencies in both statutory interpretations and factual
determinations supported by substantial evidence. This case is an
important reminder to practitioners that an agency decision will be
reversed only when the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
clearly abused its discretion.
The Michigan Court of Appeals demonstrated a similar deference in
Schultz v. Department of Environmental Quality. 64 In 1991, Mr. Schultz
applied to DEQ to build a home on pilings with an attached garage and
access drive on an all-wetland lot. 165 DEQ denied the original proposal,
but a modified permit was granted in 1996, provided Mr. Schultz granted
the agency a conservation easement over the remaining undeveloped
wetlands. 166 Mr. Schultz agreed to the modified proposal in early 1997
and submitted several proposed conservation easements over the next
two years, all of which DEQ rejected.167 DEQ closed the application file
in September 1999.168 In August 2001, Mr. Schultz moved to compel
DEQ to comply with the 1996 final determination and order leading Mr.
Schultz to appeal to circuit court. 169 In November 2002, the parties
reached an agreement that Mr. Schultz would file an appropriate
conservation easement within 30 days. 170 If DEQ chose to reject the
proposed conservation easement, it must provide reasons for its denial. '71
Over the next two years, several proposals were submitted by Mr.
Schultz and subsequently rejected by DEQ because Mr. Schultz
continued to exempt areas of his property from the conservation
easement. 172 Mr. Schultz appealed to the court of claims alleging an
unconstitutional taking of his property. 173 DEQ filed a motion for
summary disposition, which was granted by the court of claims because
Mr. Schultz's claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations
instituted for inverse condemnation claims. 1
74
164. Schultz, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 430.
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *2. The plaintiffs proposals were rejected because the proposed easements
allowed for supplementary structures to be added to the property at a later time. Id.
168. Id.
169. Schultz, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 430, at *2.
170. Id. at *2-3.
171. Id.
172. Id.




Mr. Schultz then appealed the trial court's grant of summary
disposition. 175 The court of appeals determined that the three-year statute
of limitations applied to an inverse condemnation case and that the
continuing wrong doctrine which would have tolled the statute of
limitations did not apply. 176 Most important, the court of appeals held
that the statute of limitations begins to run when the consequences of the
condemnation have "stabilized."' 177 In the court's view, the situation was
stabilized when DEQ closed Mr. Schultz's permit file in 1999.171 Of key
importance was the fact that, in his August 2001 appeal, Mr. Schultz
filed a motion to compel compliance rather than requesting a review of
DEQ's decision to close the permit file. 179 The administrative law judge
who heard the case prior to the appeal made the same determination and
indicated that Mr. Schultz's only remaining option was to file a new
permit application.' In the appellate court's view, the administrative
law judge's order marked the last possible date of accrual. 
181
The Schultz case should act as a reminder to practitioners that it is
difficult to overturn administrative decisions and that clients should
make their best efforts to reach a settlement with an agency before a final
decision is reached. Most important, once a final determination is made
the statute of limitations begins to run. Ultimately, both Jacques and
Shultz act as important reminders that overturning an agency's final
determination is very difficult, thus practitioners must remain vigilant in
addressing disputes in the administrative context.
V. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
In Department of Environmental Quality v. Bulk Petroleum Corp.,
the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld a fine of $3,364,400, which was
imposed on the owners of a gas station for their failure to comply with a
Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) and their failure to timely and
properly submit a Final Assessment Report (FAR) required by the
Michigan Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act
(NREPA). 182 The defendants in the case purchased the land at issue in
175. Schultz, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 430, at *3.
176. Id. at *5-9.
177. Id. at *10.
178. Id. at *10-11.
179. Id. at* 13.
180. Id. at *15.
181. Schultz, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 430, at *15.
182. 276 Mich. App. 654, 741 N.W.2d 857 (2007); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
ch. 124 (West 2008).
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1986.183 Five underground storage tanks on the property leaked
petroleum from about 1986 to 1999.184 In 1993, the Department of
Natural Resources, the predecessor to the DEQ, issued a UAO to require
environmental remediation of the site. The defendants failed to comply
with the UAO and also failed to submit a FAR, as required by Part 213
of NREPA. 185 Because of the failure to submit a FAR, DEQ assessed a
fine of $29,400 on August 10, 2000, which defendants did not pay.
186
Defendants began excavating contaminated soil on the property in
October of 2000.187 On December 17, 2001, the Attorney General, on
behalf of DEQ, filed a complaint against the defendants seeking penalties
of $3,364,400 and an order mandating compliance with the UAO. 1
88
On August 5, 2003, the trial court imposed a $1,090,000 penalty on
the defendants for their failure to submit a statutorily sufficient FAR. 1
89
Defendants submitted a complete FAR on October 30, 2005 and paid the
$1,090,000 penalty on December 9, 2003.190 In January 2005, defendants
moved to reduce the penalty and plaintiff moved for additional penalties
in the amount of the difference between the amount paid and the
$3,364,400 originally requested. 191 The trial court denied defendant's
motion and granted plaintiff's motion, taking into account the
seriousness of the violations and noncompliance. 1
92
The defendants appealed both penalties. With respect to the first
penalty of $1,090,000, the defendants argued that the trial court did not
have the statutory authority to impose the penalty.' 93 Part 213 of NREPA
provides that a complete FAR must be submitted by a consultant within
365 days of discovery of the release. 194 If a sufficient FAR is not
submitted in the required time, Part 213 provides for the following
penalty schedule:
(a) Not more than $100.00 per day for the first 7 days that the
report is late.
183. Bulk Petroleum, 276 Mich. App. at 655, 741 N.W.2d at 860.
184. Id. at 656, 741 N.W.2d at 860.
185. Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.2130la-.21330 (West 2008).





191. Id. at 657, 741 N.W.2d at 860-861.
192. Bulk Petroleum, 276 Mich. App. at 657, 741 N.W.2d at 861.
193. Id. at 659, 741 N.W.2d at 861.
194. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.2131 la(l) (West 2008).
[Vol. 55:313
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(b) Not more than $500.00 per day for days 8 through 14 that the
report is late.
(c) Not more than $1,000.00 per day for each day beyond day 14
that the report is late. 1
95
Based on this penalty schedule, the defendants argued that the
$1,090,000 penalty for the delinquent FAR was not within the trial
court's power to impose. 196 The court of appeals held, however, that
based on another provision in Part 213, the penalty was appropriate, even
though this provision did not relate specifically to FARs and the trial
court did not offer it as a basis. 197 The provision cited by the court of
appeals allows the Attorney General, in a case brought on behalf of
DEQ, to seek various remedies for noncompliance. 198 One such remedy
relates specifically to underground storage tanks:
A civil fine of not more than $10,000.00 for each underground
storage tank system for each day of noncompliance with a
requirement of this part or a rule promulgated under this part. A
fine imposed under this subdivision shall be based upon the
seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts by the
violator to comply with the part or rule. 199
The court of appeals held that although defendants were correct that
DEQ has only the authority to impose penalties under NREPA Section
324.21313a for an untimely FAR, the trial court, on the other hand, had
authority under Section 324.21323(1)(d) to impose the greater penalty of
$1,090,000.200
The court of appeals similarly dismissed the defendants' two other
arguments against the $1,090,000 penalty. First, the defendants argued
that the plaintiff did not meet the evidentiary burden because no evidence
was offered at the hearing. 20' The court of appeals agreed with the
plaintiff that the statute did not set forth a burden of proof for the
imposition of a fine and required only that an instance of noncompliance
had occurred.2 °2 Because the defendants had stipulated to the violations
195. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.21313a (West 2008).
196. Bulk Petroleum, 276 Mich. App. at 659, 741 N.W.2d at 861.
197. Id.
198. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.21323(1) (West 2008).
199. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.21323(1)(d) (West 2008).
200. Bulk Petroleum, 276 Mich. App. at 659-60, 741 N.W.2d at 861-62.
201. Id. at 660, 741 N.W.2d at 862.
202. Id. at 660-61, 741 N.W.2d at 862.
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underlying the penalty in their motion for summary judgment, no further
evidence was necessary.2 °3 The second argument was that the trial court
failed to properly consider the statutory criteria when it imposed the first
penalty. 2 4 Section 324.21323(1)(d) requires that fines imposed for
noncompliance involving underground storage tanks be "based upon the
seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts by the violator to
comply with the part or rule."2°5 The court held that the evidence
considered by the trial court regarding defendants' repeated
noncompliance and their failure to submit a timely and complete FAR
was sufficient to justify the penalty.20 6
Against the second penalty of $1,418,900, the defendants first argued
that Section 324.21323(l)(d) required a court to specifically enumerate
the evidence it used in determining the penalty.20 7 The court of appeals
held that the trial court did not have such a duty under the statute, and
that the trial court's statement that it had "tak[en] into account the
seriousness of the violations, the defendants' noncompliance up to
October 30, 2003, and the defendants' compliance since that time" was
sufficient.20 8 The defendants again argued that the plaintiff had not met
its evidentiary burden, and the trial court again held that the statute did
not set out an evidentiary burden, per se, and that the fact of
noncompliance had been stipulated.20 9
Defendants also argued that some of the penalties were barred by the
two-year statute of limitations period set out in Section 5809(2) Revised
Judicature Act (RJA). 210 DEQ countered that the defendants had waived
any statute of limitations defense because the issue was not raised at
trial. 21 1 The court of appeals agreed that because it is an affirmative
defense a statute of limitations defense must be raised at trial to be
properly preserved for appeal.212 Alternatively, DEQ argued that even if
the defense was not waived, the proper statute of limitations period was
203. Id. at 660-61, 741 N.W.2d at 862-63.
204. Id. at 661, 741 N.W.2d at 863.
205. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.21323(l)(d) (West 2008).
206. Bulk Petroleum, 276 Mich. App. at 662, 741 N.W.2d at 863.
207. Id. at 662-63, 741 N.W.2d at 863.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 663, 741 N.W.2d at 863.
210. Id. at 663-64, 741 N.W.2d at 864. "The period of limitations is 2 years for an
action for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture based on a penal statute brought in the
name of the people of this state." MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5809(2) (West 2008).
211. Bulk Petroleum, 276 Mich. App. at 664, 741 N.W.2d at 864.
212. Id. (citing MICH. CT. R. 2.11 1(F)(2) and (3)).
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six years, under a different provision in the RJA.2 13 Because it held that
the defendants had waived the statute of limitations defense, the court did
not reach the issue of which period to apply.
In People v. Schumacher, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed a
trial court's criminal conviction of defendant Kenneth D. Schumacher for
unlawful disposal of scrap tires.214 Mr. Schumacher was sentenced to
270 days in jail and a $10,000 fine under Part 169 of NREPA.21 5 Part
169 relates to Michigan's regulation of scrap tires and provides that scrap
tires may be disposed of only at certain facilities.2 16 The criminal
enforcement provision of the statute states in relevant part:
Violation as misdemeanor; penalties; separate violations;
authority of officer; penalties inapplicable; conditions.
(1) A person who violates this part when fewer than 50 scrap
tires are involved is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not less than
$200.00 or more than $500.00, or both, for each violation.
(2) A person who violates this part when 50 or more scrap tires
are involved is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 180 days or a fine of not less
than $500.00 or more than $10,000.00, or both, for each
violation.
(3) A person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of
this part is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 1 year or a fine of not less than $1,000.00 or
more than $25,000.00, or both, for each violation.217
Mr. Schumacher argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence at
trial to uphold his conviction because there was insufficient evidence to
prove that he knowingly violated the statute.21 8 The Michigan Court of
Appeals, however, held that the statute imposed strict liability and
213. Id. at 664, 741 N.W.2d at 864. "All other personal actions shall be commenced
within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different
period is stated in the statutes." MICH. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5813 (West 2008).
214. People v. Schumacher, 276 Mich. App. 165, 740 N.W.2d 534 (2007).
215. Id. at 166, 740 N.W.2d at 538.
216. MICH. CoMP. LAwS ANN. § § 324.16901-.16911 (West 2008).
217. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.16909(1)-(3) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
218. Schumacher, 276 Mich. App. at 167, 740 N.W.2d at 539.
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therefore no such evidence was necessary. 21 9 The court acknowledged
that the general rule is that each crime has a mens rea element. 220 But it
held that a crime under Part 169 constitutes a "public welfare offense,"
which, unlike a common law crime, is intended to prevent acts that could
injure society and not to deter direct injuries.22 Therefore, it was
necessary to prove only Mr. Schumacher knowingly and voluntarily
delivered the tires and that the delivery was violative of the statute.222
Additionally, Mr. Schumacher argued that the site where he disposed
of the scrap tires was in fact a lawful place to do so. 223 Part 169 provides,
in relevant part:
A person shall deliver a scrap tire only to a collection site
registered under section 16904, a disposal area licensed under
part 115, an end-user, a scrap tire processor, a tire retailer, or a
scrap tire recycler, that is in compliance with this part.
224
Mr. Schumacher argued that Robinson Farms, the site where he
disposed of the tires, constituted a disposal area licensed under Part 115
of NREPA.225 Part 115, which relates to solid waste management, has an
exception that allows certain facilities to operate lawfully without a
license.226 Mr. Schumacher argued that the fact that Robinson Farms
qualified under the exception under Part 115 amounted to the site being
licensed under Part 115, which in turn complied with the mandate of Part
169.227 The court disagreed with this argument, holding that "the
evidence at trial established that Robinson Farms was not licensed under
Part 115 of NREPA, and no evidence that Robinson Farms could do
certain things lawfully without a license changes that fact. 228
Mr. Schumacher also made a number of constitutional claims,
including denial of due process, violation of his Fifth Amendment right
not to be compelled to testify against himself, and denial of a fair trial.229
219. See id. at 175, 740 N.W.2d at 543.
220. Id. at 168, 740 N.W.2d at 539 (quoting People v. Tombs, 472 Mich. 446, 466, 697
N.W.2d 494 (2005)).
221. Id. (quoting Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
222. Id. at 174-75, 740 N.W.2d at 542-43.
223. Id. at 175, 740 N.W.2d at 543.
224. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.16902 (West 2001) (emphasis added), repealed
July 3, 2002.
225. Schumacher, 276 Mich. App. at 175, 740 N.W.2d at 543.
226. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.11529(1) (West 2008).
227. Schumacher, 276 Mich. App. at 175-76, 740 N.W.2d 543.
228. Id. at 176, 740 N.W.2d at 543.
229. Id. at 176-78, 740 N.W.2d at 543-44.
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The court dismissed each of Mr. Schumacher's remaining arguments
without significant discussion.230
The Bulk Petroleum and Schumacher cases demonstrate that the
executive branch in Michigan remains willing to enforce criminal
environmental laws and that the courts will impose substantial penalties
for such crimes. The outcome of Bulk Petroleum illustrates the
importance of working diligently with DEQ because future efforts may
not cure past errors, as was the case with the insufficient FAR that, while
defendants eventually did submit a complete version, resulted a penalty
of over one million dollars. The holding in Schumacher which
interpreted the criminal provision in Part 169 as a strict liability offense
may serve as a reminder that individuals and entities whose activities fall
within the scope of environmental laws must educate themselves about
the mandates of such laws because a lack of knowledge will not shield a
defendant from criminal liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the 2007-2008 Survey period did not contain any landmark
environmental decisions, the cases discussed in this article reinforce the
importance the Michigan courts place on standing, the administrative
process, and environmental liability. The purpose of this article was to
highlight general trends in environmental law and considerations which
practitioners must make when counseling clients on strategies for
success.
230. Id.
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